Theorizing Globalization: Rival Philosophical Schools of Thought

Teorías sobre la globalización: corrientes filosóficas rivales

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Abstract

Most theories of globalization are rooted in one of two philosophical schools of thought: critical theory or post-structuralism. Regardless of the advantages of these, one major disadvantage is the extreme metaphysics of otherness. This metaphysics manifests as a denial of the importance of subjectivity, particularly as construed in the western philosophical tradition from the dawn of the modern era. While there are problems with extreme notions of subjectivity, no doubt, the opposite notion of an extreme anti-subjectivity is unpalatable. In this article, I will discuss why I think Pragmatism as a school of thought ably navigates the rocky shoals of the subjectivity-anti-subjectivity divide and provides a better foundation for theories of globalization than otherwise.

Keywords: globalization, post-structuralism, critical theory, pragmatism, John Dewey, G.H. Mead, philosophy of education
La mayoría de las teorías sobre la globalización tienen su fundamento en una de dos corrientes filosóficas: la teoría crítica o el postestructuralismo. A pesar de sus ventajas, una considerable desventaja de estas teorías es la metafísica extrema de la alteridad. Esta metafísica se expresa como una negación de la importancia de la subjetividad, específicamente, según se ha interpretado en la tradición filosófica occidental desde los comienzos de la época moderna. Aunque, sin duda, las nociones extremas de la subjetividad dan lugar a problemas o dudas, la idea contraria de una anti-subjetividad extrema es inaceptable. En este artículo, explicaré la razón por la cual considero que el pragmatismo, como corriente de pensamiento, puede navegar de manera más adecuada los bancos rocosos que bordean la división entre subjetividad y anti-subjetividad, y proveer una mejor base para las teorías sobre la globalización.

Resumen

La mayoría de las teorías sobre la globalización tienen su fundamento en una de dos corrientes filosóficas: la teoría crítica o el postestructuralismo. A pesar de sus ventajas, una considerable desventaja de estas teorías es la metafísica extrema de la alteridad. Esta metafísica se expresa como una negación de la importancia de la subjetividad, específicamente, según se ha interpretado en la tradición filosófica occidental desde los comienzos de la época moderna. Aunque, sin duda, las nociones extremas de la subjetividad dan lugar a problemas o dudas, la idea contraria de una anti-subjetividad extrema es inaceptable. En este artículo, explicaré la razón por la cual considero que el pragmatismo, como corriente de pensamiento, puede navegar de manera más adecuada los bancos rocosos que bordean la división entre subjetividad y anti-subjetividad, y proveer una mejor base para las teorías sobre la globalización.

Palabras clave: globalización, postestructuralismo, teoría crítica, pragmatismo, John Dewey, G.H. Mead, filosofía de la educación

Globalization theory and philosophies of education

Read a manuscript discussing educational theory in light of globalization. What philosophical lenses are you likely to find? If you range back through the past 12 years or so, chances are it will be the same two or three of the many possible lenses extant (Burbules & Torres, 2000).¹ These are Critical Theory and Post-structuralism (Besley & Peters, 2007; Biesta & Peters, 2009; Burbules & Torres, 2000; Cole, 2005; Cook, 2004; Crossley & Watson, 2003; Hoppers, 2000; Popkewitz, 2008; Spring, 2001, 2006; Stromquist, 2002; Torres, 2009).² More recently, pragmatism has come into vogue (Tan & Whalen-Bridge, 2008; Taylor, Scheirer, & Ghiraldelli, 2008). There are obviously alternatives to these, but they seem to be underrepresented, to judge by a cursory review of the literature (Dhillon, 2007). Now, what are we to make of this state of affairs? One might be tempted to say that 1. Theory is in vogue, and that philosophies such as critical theory, but especially post-structuralism, are tailor-made for theory. One might also be tempted to say that 2. Critical theory and post-structuralism take political economy seriously—a field of scholarship that is essential to, if not the ground of, the various theories of globalization. Finally, one might be tempted to say that 3. Critical theory and Post-structuralism are right and true, or if not true at least the best philosophical accounts for any theory that purports to examine social relationships, and therefore are the right and true or best philosophical accounts to undergird theories of globalization.

I believe that 1 and 2 are correct, but that 3 is wrong. I will discuss why 3 is wrong in a further section. For now, I wish to concentrate on 1 and 2. I believe 1 to be correct on the basis of the sheer volume of studies devoted to globalization and education that are critical-theoretic or post-structuralist in philosophic persuasion. While not denying 3 here, I think the fact that the range of philosophical options from which theorists of globalization could have chosen is vast and yet the choices made so narrow accounts for more than just the ‘rightness’ of these particular philosophies. It accounts for the fashionability of these as well. I believe 2 to be correct because most of the scholarship on globalization does concern both the political-economic origins and consequences of national and multinational, strategies. There is of course, much scholarship on groups, communities, and individuals involved, as these are often on the receiving end of the effects of globalization; but these relationships, too, are very often cast in a political-economic framework.

However, fashionability and the close alliance with scholarship on political economy are not the only, and not even the greatest reasons why I think critical theory and post-structuralism are regnant. I think they are regnant because they have done an inestimable job of pressing the contradictions and confusions of what I will call extreme subjectivity. That is, I imagine that this feature of critical theory and post-

¹ I say this because the landmark text introducing theory of globalization in education is Nicholas Burbules and Carlos Alberto Torres (2000). I say philosophical not to exclude other theoretical lenses, but to delineate just those lenses that draw on thinkers wholly a part of the philosophical tradition.

² I do not include (most) feminist and post-colonial analyses here, because these are not strictly speaking, philosophical programs unless they evidence a metaphysics; however, when they do emphasize a metaphysics, it is very often of critical-theoretic or post-structuralist design.
structuralism invites theorists of globalization to take them seriously, and more seriously, perhaps, than other philosophies. Both critical theory and post-structuralism lay great emphasis on the denial of, or opposition to strong notions of self, subjectivity, and self-consciousness. This is in contradistinction to earlier traditions of philosophy, and particularly the Cartesian tradition. The Cartesian tradition was the tradition of the irreducible “I” that thinks according to “clear and distinct ideas.” René Descartes put it this way in the second Meditation:

> Therefore from the very fact that I know that I exist, and that meanwhile I notice nothing plainly different as belonging to my nature or essence except this alone, that I am a thinking thing, I rightly conclude that my essence consists in this one thing, that I am a thinking thing. And although perhaps, or rather... I have a body that is very closely conjoined to me, nonetheless because on the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of myself insofar as I am only an unextended thinking thing, and on the other hand a distinct idea of my body insofar as it is only an extended non-thinking thing, it is certain that I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without it (Descartes, 1998, p. 56).

Extreme forms of subjectivity brought many philosophical puzzles, and these puzzles took the better part of 300 years to unravel. The Cartesian germ ensconced itself in much modern philosophy and only in the 20th century, partly through the efforts of both critical theorists and post-structuralists, has it been exposed and sidelined. For example, the claim that we have unlimited and direct access to the contents of our minds has been steadily challenged since the time of Immanuel Kant. And the mind-body dualism that claims there is one substance, but two kinds of properties (physical and mental) has taken a severe beating in the 20th century. Beyond this, the claim that the self is the locus of consciousness, and even that the self is systematic and self-articulating, has come into question. Philosophies of otherness, or philosophies privileging strong accounts of the social, are preferred to philosophies that emphasize a strong, overly autonomous or individuated, self.

What is it about subjectivity that philosophies of otherness in vogue in theories of globalization decry? After all, strong accounts of autonomy are privileged in philosophies of subjectivity; accounts that at least imply a robust sense of individual freedom, dignity, and moral personality. But therein lies the problem; individuality or, more precisely, individualism. This understanding is closely allied to a classical liberal conception of the free and autonomous person who has inalienable rights to property. More recently, it is allied to a neo-liberal conception of the individual—a veritable homo economicus whose relations with others are merely instrumental (Rizvi, 2009, p. 257). This particular political conception of the person is thought to be given further emphasis by accounts of autonomy, which are in turn bolstered by theories of subjectivity.

Thus and despite the seeming differences between critical theory and post-structuralism, each shares (at least) one feature in common with the other; anti-subjectivism. By anti-subjectivism, I mean the disavowal of the Cartesian claim that the I is the central metaphysical mark of knowledge. This claim has been variously understood as the “philosophy of consciousness” and the “philosophy of the subject” (Habermas, 1992, p. 16). From German Idealism onwards, and with varying degrees of success, philosophers have attempted to distance themselves from the extreme subjectivist standpoint. The first and common way was to recognize the central importance of the other for self-consciousness. This “counter-enlightenment project” was begun in earnest by Johann Gottlieb Fichte, who developed rudimentary theories of the subject and recognition (Habermas, 1987; Henrich, 1992). Fichte asked two questions in The Foundations of Natural Right (1796). The first is how self-consciousness is possible. The answer is that the self posits itself as a not-self and this (Fichte tells us) is the Law of Freedom or Autonomy (Fichte, 2005). However, this law concerns only the possibility of self-consciousness; self-consciousness, as it actually occurs is a development that relies upon the recognition (Anerkennung) of another. Fichte calls this development “heteronymous nature,” to distinguish it from his talk of autonomy (Fichte, 2005, p. 94). Heteronymous nature consists in what Fichte calls “a summons” (Aufforderung). This consists in the summoning of the other who then recognizes herself as an agent (Fichte, 2005, p. 95). Unfortunately, Fichte did not develop this account further; it was left to later idealists and particularly G.W.F. Hegel to offer a robust account of self-consciousness involving recognition.

Hegel did so in the Phenomenology of Spirit and later publications. For Hegel, recognition of the other is central to overcome the conflict that our conceptual understanding of what Hegel calls “consciousness” (Bewusstsein) brings upon itself when it attempts to adjudicate the role of self in regards to appearances and laws (forces) (Hegel, 1977, p. 172). “Consciousness” is a form or shape of thought or Spirit in which the role of the self becomes evident in any understanding of the world. However, there is a rank solipsism
in devolving thought on the self (I) alone: The self cannot ground the claims of itself to understand the world without recourse to something other—at least, not without circularity. This other can only be another self (Hegel, 1977, p. 178). The turn to the other in understanding our understandings of self is the operating premise of the shape of thought Hegel calls “self-consciousness” (Selbstbewusstsein), and is a premise taken seriously by many later philosophers—critical as they might be of idealism.

Critical theory and post-structuralism accept in part the critique of subjectivism that German Idealism first brought forth. However, what this turn to the other means for them differs. For critical theory, as I will maintain, the turn to the other manifests as a turn away from subjectivity toward the object. This is notable particularly in Adorno’s project of conceiving a “negative dialectics” to rival and supplant what he sees as the Hegelian dialectics of synthesizing opposites. For post-structuralist theories such as Derrida’s, this is done through essentializing difference—the metaphysical denial of something like a Hegelian unity, totality, or synthesis of the concept. But critical theory and post-structuralism are not the only—and in my opinion, not even the best—anti-subjectivist philosophies offering accounts of the other and otherness extant. I will argue that only pragmatism, and specifically, the pragmatists Dewey and Mead, accomplished a turn to the other that refused to reject the self. This was accomplished through positing a rival theory of the self; one that is naturalistic and immanent, rather than metaphysical or totalizing. Furthermore, pragmatism is the only viable philosophy offering a plausible account of problem-solving; an account which can be tailored to the context of teacher education. I will discuss each of these attempts at overcoming subjectivism in order.

Rival philosophies of anti-subjectivity: Critical theory, poststructuralism, and pragmatism

The anti-subjective basis of critical theory. Critical theory has its roots in the early 20th century project of criticisms of social institutions and culture famously undertaken by the so-called first generation of Frankfurt School researchers, especially Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. The Frankfurt School for Social Research was an empirical-critical program, unlike the strictly ideological programs plentiful among Marxists in the early half of the 20th century. Horkheimer in particular, laid the most problematic element of these ideological programs—the rise of instrumental reason—at Kant’s feet. For Horkheimer, Kant’s separation of science and morality (knowledge and faith) was tantamount to allowing scientific rationality unlimited access to culture (Horkheimer, 1993, p. 20). For Adorno, Hegel’s (and Kant’s) legacy is more ambiguous. Adorno recognized the importance of Hegel to Marx’s later theory of socialism and the importance of German idealism generally to the project of the emancipation of the working classes; he was, however, critical of the supposed “tyranny of the concept” in Hegel’s philosophical system. Hegel, Adorno claimed, left no room for the material; for matter; for the objective. Everything was sublated in spirit (Adorno, 1973, p. 7). Spirit in turn was absolute identity; the affirmation of all that is and is not. Characteristically, Adorno thought Hegel’s account of absolute identity a failure.

The principle of absolute identity is self-contradictory. It perpetuates non-identity in suppressed and damaged form. A trace of this entered into Hegel’s effort to have non-identity absorbed by the philosophy of identity, indeed, to define identity by non-identity. Yet Hegel is distorting the state of facts by affirming identity, admitting non-identity as a negative—albeit a necessary one—and misconceiving the negativity of the universal. He lacks sympathy with the utopian particular [the “empirical content”] that has been buried underneath the universal—with that non-identity which would not come into being until realized reason has left the particular reason of the universal behind (Adorno, 1973, p. 318).

Against this abstractionism, Adorno famously countered with a “negative dialectics,” which, as an anti-identity philosophy, would re-establish the primacy of the material. “To change this direction of conceptuality, to give it a turn toward non-identity [the non-subject; the not-self; the not-I], is the hinge of negative dialectics. Insight into the constitutive character of the nonconceptual in the concept would end the compulsive identification, which the concept brings unless halted by such reflection. Reflection upon its own meaning is the way out of the concept’s seeming being-in-itself as a unity of meaning” (Hegel, 1969, p. 12). It is debatable whether Adorno was successful in overcoming the Hegelian machinery of identity and unity (Habermas, 1987, p. 128).

The anti-subjective basis of post-structuralism. I will use the umbrella term, post-structuralism for a distinctive continental response to Martin Heidegger’s call to an end of metaphysics. The concern here is the essentially dispersed nature of discourse, thought, and practice. Poststructuralists do not deny truth; nor do they admit that their philosophical conceptions are relative amongst other conceptions.
They defend their core ideas and ideals, and even posit an “ultimate reality” (Schroeder, 2005, p. 268). In contradistinction to the history of Western philosophy which stresses unity, wholeness, organicism, and centrality (particularly in the wake of Descartes), post-structuralism stresses fragmentation, disunity, diffusion, and difference. Often, the goal is to get back behind the claims to unity, to reveal the essentially fragmentary nature of various systems of truth and discourses (in Michel Foucault’s terms). The fragmentary nature of these is best represented by notions such as Gilles Deleuze’s rhizomes, Jacques Derrida’s trace and critique of self-presence(s), and Foucault’s “regimes of truth”. Philosophies of the subject, which supposedly privilege a spectator theory of knowledge, truth, and subjectivity, and which in turn account for a privileged self-consciousness, are unmasked as totalizing narratives that conceal their essential lack of depth.

But what is consciousness? What does consciousness mean? Most often, in the very form of meaning, in all its modifications, consciousness offers itself to thought only as self-presence, as the perception of self in presence. And what holds for consciousness holds here for so-called subjective existence in general. Just as the category of the subject cannot be, and never has been, thought without the reference to presence as hypokeimenon or as ousia, etc., so the subject as consciousness has never manifested itself except as self-presence. The privilege granted to consciousness therefore signifies the privilege granted to the present; and even if one describes the transcendental temporality of consciousness, and at the depth at which Husserl does so, one grants to the “living present” the power of synthesizing traces, and of incessantly reassembling them (Derrida, 1993, p. 68).

If consciousness is the power of synthesizing (and reassembling) traces in the moment, post-structuralism (and Derrida’s deconstruction) is the activity of setting them free.

Sometimes subjectivity is turned on its head. In this inversion, subjectivity connotes an extreme self-fashioning individual. Foucault’s Nietzschean-inspired inward turn to aesthetic self-cultivation is the best example of this. Foucault’s attempt to recuperate a quasi-Stoic care of the self for the contemporary context is the counterpart to his denial of subjectivity (Foucault, 1988). In Foucault’s estimation, the self is constructed through habit, practice, and disposition, rather than reason, autonomy, or reflexive self-awareness. These practices Foucault famously labels, “regimes of truth.” “Truth” is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. A regime of truth... is not merely ideological or superstructural; it was a condition of the formation and development of capitalism. And it is the same regime which, subject to certain modifications, operates in the socialist countries....” (Foucault, 1980, p. 131). We are locked into practices inasmuch as we have no other means through which to conduct our discourse(s). Our only hope (and it is a dim one) is the Nietzschean inspired endeavour to self-cultivate aesthetically—to will to be otherwise, by inculcating habits and attitudes that operate against the grain of the dominant.

The anti-subjective basis of pragmatism. The first Anglo-American school of thought historically critical of extreme accounts of subjectivity and the philosophy of consciousness is of course pragmatism. This is particularly true of William James and John Dewey. James was famous for his dislike of “hegelisms” and he saw German Idealism in particular as endlessly multiplying abstract ideas, culminating in a vacuous Absolute Spirit (James, 1956). To this, James contrasted radical empiricism and pragmatism. James was an empiricist at heart; questions of knowledge and truth were ascertained not by abstraction or idealization, but by experience and the outcome of experimentation. Nevertheless, James had in common with German Idealism (and particularly, Hegel) the criticism of phenomenalism and crude empiricism in favour of an understanding of knowledge tempered by time, place, sentiment, and circumstance. In

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3 The notion of post-structuralism as essential dispersion comes from William Schroeder “To be dispersed is to become scattered and diffused without pattern. Dispersion is a process as well as a resulting configuration of relationships... As a process, “dispersion” suggests that the dividing, self-repelling operation is ongoing, unceasing. Things have not simply “fallen apart”; they continue to fall further apart. Philosophies of dispersion conceptualize everything as skewed (in space and time); nothing coalesces or develops into organic unity” (2005, p. 267).
4 Indeed, there would otherwise be little reason to take them seriously.
5 Of course, this was not Kant’s understanding of self-consciousness. On Derrida’s reading of self-consciousness, we are talking of the empirical self, not the “transcendental unity of apperception.”
6 These traces are themselves ephemeral; disappearing images present then absent, never to return. There is no depth to presence; it is all surface. And there is no undergirding to the self; not even subconscious drives. The edifice of the self is supported only in this moment. Put this way, what we have here is a rejection of the accounts of Augustine, Locke, Hume, Descartes, Kant, and Hegel—indeed, of the history of western attempts at construing the self.
7 Of course, other Anglo-American schools of thought were also critical of subjectivism; indeed, almost all of the various schools that can be grouped together as ‘Analytic’ count in this regard. However, as the task here is to discuss schools of thought that have an influence on globalization theories, I will confine myself to pragmatism.
many ways, James naturalized Hegel’s notion of the developing self-aware self, particularly with his apt
descriptions of the self as both material and personal (Dewey, 1984; James, 1918, p. 385).

For his part, Dewey acknowledged the debt to Hegel. Dewey began as a neo-Hegelian and tried to
unite spirit and nature in an overarching psychological account of self. He was unsuccessful at this;
however, Dewey would eventually provide a hugely successful experimentalist account of psychology.
Dewey can be called a naturalized Hegelian: in place of subjective Spirit, Dewey has growth; in place
of Civil Society, Dewey has community; in place of the State, Dewey has democracy (Garrison, 2006;
Good, 2006). Adjustment, adaptation, and other naturalistic metaphors serve as substitutes for Hegelian
metaphors of alienation, rupture, sublation, and self-sundering. Dewey discarded subjectivism after his
initial enchantment with neo-Idealism and was critical of the metaphysics he saw as all-too prevalent.
Consciousness Dewey admitted, but it too, was naturalized; in Dewey’s estimation, there was no
Absolute Spirit to which consciousness ascends. There were merely the relations of meanings built up
through inquiry—itself an experimental accounting of mind and thought. Here is Dewey discussing
consciousness directly;

The ties and bonds of associated life are spontaneous uncalculated manifestations of this phase of human selfhood, as the
union of hydrogen and oxygen is natural and unpremeditated. Sociability, communication, are just as much immediate
traits of the concrete individual as is the privacy of the closet of consciousness. To define oneself within closed limits, and
then to try out the self in expansive acts that inevitably result in an eventual breaking down of the walled-in self, are equally
natural and inevitable acts. Here is the ultimate “dialectic” of the universal and individual. One no sooner establishes
his private and subjective self than he demands it be recognized and acknowledged by others, even if he has to invent an
imaginary audience or an absolute self to satisfy the demand (Dewey, 1981, p. 187).

More than any other recent thinker, Dewey rejected the dualism he thought lay at the heart of Cartesian
and much post-Cartesian philosophy—a dualism he found pernicious because, as he argued, the world
was carved up into non-natural entities and ideas that had to be fitted together again in a systematic, all-
embracing philosophical account. The dualism, however, existed only in the minds of philosophers.

**Ranking philosophies for Globalization Theory**

Contemporary accounts denying subjectivity deny the relationships and connections between disparate
phenomena and events and/or situations. Contemporary accounts often do not have an account of
unity and difference; what they provide is an account of unending difference. Here, we may think of
post-structuralist attempts at deconstructing or otherwise unpacking claims of unity and identity and
the various schools gathered under the umbrella of a “philosophy of dispersion” (Schröder, 2005, pp.
267-268). These argue that organic unity—ultimate reality—is endlessly fragmented and this is made
evident through investigations into social institutions and the social sciences (Foucault), the metaphysics
of self-presence (Derrida), and philosophy itself (Deleuze). Taken together, a very large swathe of what
we consider intellectual thought (including history, politics, sociology, philosophy—indeed all of the
Human Sciences or Geisteswissenschaften) consists of relations, linkages and elements that are endlessly
differentiated. This claim often gets expressed in the language of ‘heterogeneity’ or ‘paralogy’, or
‘multiplicity.’ (We may also include Adorno’s “negative dialectics”) (Adorno, 1973, pp. 12, 19). The
equation of unity in unity and difference gives way to an essentialization of difference. And each difference
is differentiated into further differences, seemingly ad infinitum. In no case can an account of identity, in
which “what is, is and what is not, is not” be construed from these attempts; for “what is” always gives
way to “what is not”, with no opportunity for reconciliation or return (Aristotle, 1941).

The problem with essentializing difference (and its sequalae of relations endlessly differentiated, de-
centered, and fragmented ad infinitum) is twofold: first, we would need a conceptual understanding of
unity in order to see the endlessly differentiated as endlessly differentiated. This was one of Hegel’s points
in the Science of Logic: we can only see something for itself from the purview of its unity with something

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1 Dewey rejected the absolutism of self after his turn from Hegel to naturalism in the mid 1890’s. The question for Dewey scholars is what constitutes this absolutism that Dewey turned away from? In Dewey’s opinion, it was clear that absolutism connoted a totalizing whole. However, this is a poor understanding of Hegel’s absolute spirit, which behaved nothing like a totalizing whole. It is also surprising, given the parallels between Dewey’s theory of inquiry and Hegel’s logic and dialectic. Good has done much to dispel both this reading of Hegel, and the distance between Dewey’s organic method of inquiry and Hegel’s social and political thought.
other than itself (something for other) (Hegel, 1969, p. 63). Absent this unity, there can be no negativity, and no other to which to differentiate. In other words, a dynamic logic that conceptualizes unity and difference (contra Adorno and Derrida) is required to represent endless difference, dispersion, or negation.9 Second and more important, each of the differences we elucidate in a deconstructive process is itself a unity; as difference is endlessly differentiated, so each alighting on difference is an alighting on some unity—even if this unity is further differentiated. It is not optional that we consider any particular idea or conception (or representation) a unity; in order for further differentiation to occur, we must infer back from the point we now occupy to the previous and claim that this was a unity. All accounts—post-structuralist included—must admit this, and this is why essentializing of difference ad infinitum is bound to failure.

There are further philosophical conundrums that arise; without an account of unity and difference, we cannot say why, when, or under what circumstances we should consider phenomena, experiences, or ideas connected or unconnected; we cannot theorize the conditions under which these might or might not be related; and we cannot draw inferences regarding these connections or relations. We also have no explanatory power when it comes to events or situations because, absent a theory of unity and difference, we cannot draw relationships between occurrences. And if we cannot do that, we have no business making normative (including political) claims about the reasons why we prefer this or that program, or why one program should be preferable to another. We could not understand when phenomena or objects or ideas are to be brought together, under what circumstances they are to be brought together; or when phenomena or objects or ideas are to be differentiated from one another. We would be left with Hume’s explanations for (causal) relations; association, proximity, and custom, with no understanding of how (or why) these operate in various moral contexts and situations. In terms of the self, we would be unable to say how representations come together or what the relationships between representations are; as we would have recourse to neither descriptive metaphysical accounts of the self’s unity (I am thinking here of Kant), nor immanent metaphysical accounts of the self’s unity (such as Hegel’s or Dewey and Mead’s, as I shall discuss), we would be left with the notion of the self as a “bundle or collection of different perceptions” (Hume’s account of the self), but with no understanding of why the representations and meanings the self supposedly orders to operate as they do (Hume, 1978, p. 253).

Pragmatism (at least, on Dewey and Mead’s accounts) avoids these conundrums. Pragmatism has an answer to the question of the self’s unity; and it is a positive answer. Unlike in critical theory (Adorno’s) or post-structuralist accountings of self, there is no wholesale turn to the negative, or to essentialized difference. Consider Dewey’s account of how we recognize ourselves in recognizing others.

The ties and bonds of associated life are spontaneous uncalculated manifestations of this phase of human selfhood, as the union of hydrogen and oxygen is natural and unpremeditated. Sociability, communication, are just as much immediate traits of the concrete individual as is the privacy of the closet of consciousness. To define oneself within closed limits, and to try out the self in expansive acts that inevitably result in an eventual breaking down of the walled-in self, are equally natural and inevitable acts. Here is the ultimate “dialectic” of the universal and individual. One no sooner establishes his private and subjective self than he demands it be recognized and acknowledged by others, even if he has to invent an imaginary audience or an absolute self to satisfy the demand (Dewey, 1981, p. 187).

G.H. Mead gives an even more robust accounting of the role of consciousness. He says:

Our whole experiential world—nature as we experience it—is basically related to the social process of behaviour, a process in which acts are initiated by gestures that function as such because they in turn call forth adjutive responses from other organisms, as indicating or having relation to the completion or resultant of the acts they initiate… The whole content of mind and of nature, in so far as it takes on the character of meaning, is dependent upon this triadic relation within the social process and among the component phases of the social act, which the existence of meaning presupposes (Mead, 1934, p. 112).

Mead continues:

Consciousness or experience as thus explained or accounted for in terms of the social process cannot, however, be located in the brain—not only because such location of it implies a spatial conception of mind… Consciousness is functional,

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9 I say contra Adorno because this will likely require some attention to the logic of identity; the ability to correctly say of something “what is, is and what is not, is not,” in Aristotle’s terms. This is an essential feature of Kant’s logic and Hegel’s as well. Though Dewey quite rightly avers from a metaphysical claim regarding identity, he nevertheless admits we must have a functional understanding of the logic of identity to distinguish parts (of inquiry) from wholes (of situations) in order to experiment. See Dewey (1986b).
It is enough, pragmatists will say, to claim that the self is self-aware at some level or in some sense, and that this is a condition for knowledge, communication, and associated living. Mead’s naturalized, Hegelian alternative to mentalist approximations of consciousness makes Dewey’s point even clearer and more forceful.

While all of the accounts discussed here are anti-subjectivist, what should make Dewey and Mead’s accounts more attractive to educators developing a theory of globalization than the critical theory and post-structuralist ones is that they have naturalized, immanent metaphysical accounts of self and others that do not rely either on a wholesale turn to the negative, nor an essentialization of differences. There is a dialectical movement, in other words, which proceeds from self to other and back again, whereas critical theory and post-structuralism turn away from the self and remain fixed at the site of the other. We can theorize how the self transforms itself through the other in these naturalistic accounts of pragmatism; a transformation that is denied to critical theory (Adorno) and post-structuralism through their reification of negativity, otherness, and difference.

Pressing pragmatism’s advantage

Having an immanent, naturalized accounting of self and other allows for a dialectical understanding of the relationship of person to community—a relationship necessary to understand ideas of global community. Theories of globalization need such an account for two reasons: first, to explain how relationships amongst persons, cultures, languages, take place and how socioeconomic differences come about and operate; second, to demonstrate why we ought to go about securing better ones in the face of problematic situations. I will discuss both of these reasons. Communities establish themselves organically, not transcendentally; that is to say, communities come together over natural needs such as survival, trade, economies, as well as the more familiar groupings of family, tribe, language, and state/nation. There is no transcendental sense in which a group is a group. There is thus nothing more unique about groups and communities than persons or individuals. They each have their natural, social existence and they are the other’s point of departure. Second, an immanent and naturalized account of self and other operates on a model of transformation (what Dewey would call “growth”) that is dialectical (Dewey, 1987, p. 21). Tensions between the relation of self/s to other/s (and other/s to self/s) serve as the point of departure for inquiry into the social conditions that manifest in the tension. Out of the solution to (social) problems a community of persons with shared interests and experiences derives.

This community is premised on experiencing and shared problem-solving, rather than a transcendental claim defining what a community is beforehand. Thus, a community’s origins are traced to the shared experiences and problem-solving of its individuals. This is both the site of origin for novel communities and the key to how to theorize the development of new communities from established ones (communities based in language, geography, kinship, economy, gender, and race, as well as political communities such as state and/or nation). Novel communities develop out of existing ones through persons’ attention to shared experiences and social inquiry into social problems, and they do so without destroying the existing communities to which these persons already belong. Certainly, these existing communities transform, but they are transformed by becoming larger and fuller iterations of themselves, capable of not only housing the relations that form what they once were, but of expanding to include the new relations—the passage of community to what Dewey once called the “great community” (Dewey, 1982, p. 360).

This is a naturalized variant of the Hegelian motif of “sublation” (Aufhebung) (Hegel, 1977, p. 29). Tensions internal to communities brought about by existing social problems bring on social inquiry; social inquiry transforms the community through novel relationships and resultant social practices. The older community is transformed: while maintaining many of its older relationships and practices it takes on new ones and becomes a larger and more progressive iteration of itself. The key to transforming the community is social inquiry and social problem-solving. Once tensions are identified within the community, those within must undertake inquiry of the conditions under which the community is experiencing problems, investigate these problems, propose solutions, and carry these out. The community, in other words, must operate experimentally to determine and solve its problems.
Solutions to problems posed by globalization theory require a similar approach. Attention to the problems caused by 'theorizing' theory as either a wholesale turn to the other, or an essentialization of negativity or difference must be carried out. The one-sidedness of these approaches will readily be discovered, and their inflexibility and antagonism towards a dialectic involving persons (self and other) that ultimately privileges neither will be duly noted. Once the limitations of theory's own theorizing of the relationships between selves and others is recognized, a model of experimental problem-solving needs to be put forth. This will include calls for earnest investigation into the existential problems arising from existing relationships between persons and organizations already in operation. These problems are context-bound, and require methods that are context-sensitive. Both problem-finding and problem-solving methods, as Dewey maintains, will be necessary at this beginning stage of inquiry (Dewey, 1986b, p. 109). This is perhaps the most important stage of inquiry in terms of investigation of globalization and its attendant consequences because it requires deliberate attention to the existential and experiential natures of the problem from as many that experience the problem as can be found. Problems are felt, and felt problems remain unarticulated until adequately investigated and theorized. But to theorize a problem to the point of articulation means to undertake a deliberate investigation into its conditions, requiring the development of novel premises and conclusions, rather than any wholesale application of a metaphysical theory. Given the abundance of competing and contradictory theories of globalization, resisting this application is the most difficult challenge of all.

In one respect, programs of teacher education now beginning to confront the myriad complexities of globalization are in a good position. This is because they are only beginning to develop the concentrated relationships in which problems are manifest. They are therefore spared some of the difficulties in articulating problems in those environments. This is not to say that problems that already exist are fully articulated — they are surely not, and one of the reasons (the reason I am stressing here) is the poverty of existing theories to articulate them. Nevertheless, the unique position that programs of teacher education find themselves in means that novel relationships can be examined for novel tensions that might develop; tensions leading to “felt problems” (often of a normative or moral nature) into which we can then inquire. This can be done at the faculty level. For example, faculties thinking of engaging in relationships with corporations for funding, or with organizations for teaching placements, or with exchanges with other universities, can identify potential problems and bring these to the point of articulation. These can be inquired into, in an experimental manner, through the postulation of “anticipated consequences” which, when carried through, either net a solution to the problem or require revision and/or replacement (Dewey, 1986a).
Discussion

Teacher education programs will soon be faced with having to make normative decisions regarding their curricula, personnel, structure and function on the basis of changes wrought by globalization. I believe that understanding what these changes are, why they present themselves as they do, and what, if any, choices can be made in regard to them, is vitally important if these programs are to survive in any recognizable form. This requires theory. What theories we adopt should not be a simple pick and choose affair; we should adopt those theories that do their best to articulate the sorts of problems we will face— problems that are not merely institutional or structural, but personal and experiential. We should be especially cautious of adopting theories that have behind them a metaphysical apparatus of difference, negativity, or otherness, or those that have no problem-solving methods embedded, or problem-solving methods that are tied so tightly to their metaphysics that they are inflexible. Such theories will be one-sided and, by definition, will neglect important subjective elements of experiencing, problem-solving, and relating. Nor will their accounts of problem-solving be driven by the context or situations in which the problems occur; rather, they will be driven by a pre-determined metaphysical program. We will instead want a philosophy that privileges neither the self nor the other. We will want a philosophy that has an account of how the self and other interrelate, as well as how larger iterations of relations form and sustain themselves. Most of all, we will want a philosophy that has a cogent account of transformation. I submit that the best philosophy—the one that has accounts of each of these—is pragmatism. It is pragmatism that we should therefore choose.

When we press the advantage of pragmatism and specifically, a Deweyan conception of inquiry that responds to “felt problems” arising from the immanent tensions in social relationships (though obviously, a corresponding tension arises in the application of certain metaphysical philosophies to issues of globalization), we see that pragmatism has a natural, dialectical understanding of the person and community, together with an understanding of inquiry that accounts for (indeed, leads to) social transformation, and does so without recourse to essentializing differences, a turn to negativity, or the denigration of the self. This more flexible account of transformation makes it more adaptable to the “felt problems” of those in teaching communities broaching the numerous normative difficulties created by engaging head-on in globalization projects.
References


